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ABSTRACT
ROCCO, FRANCIS Bitcoin Volatility and Currency Acceptance: A Time-Series Approach.
Department of Economics, June 2017
ADVISOR: HOLT, HARLAN
Virtual currencies emerged in 2009 as alternatives to traditional methods of payment,
offering faster transaction speeds and increased privacy. The prime example of these currencies
is Bitcoin. Prior literature in the past five years has generally predicted that bitcoin would fail to
supplant an existing widely traded currency, but the volatility of the currency has been
decreasing since then. I test Dowd and Greenaway’s (1993) currency acceptance model using
recent data on Bitcoin, including Bitcoin volatility. This paper will show whether Bitcoin's
ability to act as a store of value and its level of price volatility affect the number of people that
will accept it as a currency. Confidence in existing currencies may be weakening, and thus,
analyzing the relationship between volatility and currency acceptance is significant in
understanding the future behavior of currencies. I will employ a time-series vector
autoregression to determine the effects of the number of vendors that accept Bitcoin, the
volatility of the Bitcoin, the volatility of the dollar, and the volatility of the Euro on both Bitcoin
volatility and the number of vendors that accept Bitcoin. I will also run Newey-West regressions
to determine the effects of each volatility on the number of vendors.
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1 Introduction
In the past few decades, major technological advancements have begun to streamline the
purchasing process for millions of consumers. With the advent of credit cards, online shopping,
and mobile wallet services, it has become increasingly simple to make purchases of all sizes.
More recently in 2009, a new type of currency emerged—one that could exist solely on the
internet and yet maintain the requirements to serve just as a physical currency would. The prime
example of this type of currency is Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency in the world. Despite being
the first of its kind, Bitcoin offers many unique characteristics that govern how it transacts, such
as the ability to conduct transactions anonymously, maintain security, and perhaps most
importantly, its status as a decentralized currency. No single entity has sole command over
Bitcoin and its only constraints are the proofing mechanisms that exist to limit its supply. This
characteristic offers security for those concerned with inflation expectations.
Bitcoin's inception occurred on October 31, 2008 when Satoshi Nakamoto (a widely
speculated pseudonym for a small group of people) published Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic
Cash System detailing the construction and implementation of a peer-to-peer electronic cash
system (Nakamoto, 2008). Transactions within the system could be verified, authenticated, and
protected through coding software. These characteristics also provided a mechanism to prevent
multiple instances of the same transaction and, ultimately, fraudulent transactions.
Given Bitcoin's relatively short time in circulation thus far, people may be more or less
likely to accept it as a currency. Dowd and Greenaway (1993) developed a currency acceptance
model that incorporates switching costs and network effects (which will be defined later), and
then predicts a critical mass of users that must be reached in order for the economy to switch to
the new currency. By applying that model to recent data regarding Bitcoin, this paper will
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attempt to show whether Bitcoin's ability to act as a store of value and its level of price volatility
affect the number of people that will accept it as a currency.

2 Bitcoin History and Terminology
It is necessary to define some terminology regarding Bitcoin's operation as follows: a
block is a cluster of transactions that occur within a ten-minute period. Further, there is a master
register of verified Bitcoin transactions, and certain participants in the Bitcoin transaction
network (known as miners) are chosen to verify each of the blocks. The master register is known
as a blockchain which is readily available online, but the anonymity arises in the difficulty of
determining the identity of a specific user by their transactions. When a miner successfully
verifies a block the fastest, his or her solution is sent out to the network. Once the network
verifies that the solution is correct (by majority rule), the miner receives some bitcoins as
payment. The difficulty of this process increases every two weeks to ensure a fair competition
between all of the miners. Additionally, given the required ten-minute period for blocks to form,
it is generally suggested to wait through six rounds of verification before concluding that a
transaction was properly added to the blockchain, which can be much faster than a typical
electronic payment 1 (Segendorf, 2014).
On January 3, 2009, the first block, known thereafter as the Genesis Block or Block 0,
was mined. On January 9, 2009, the first version of the Bitcoin interface was released
("Abridged", 2013). The generation system for each unit possessed the capability to create 21
million total bitcoins into the year 2040. There are currently around 16 million bitcoins in
circulation. On October 5, 2009, the New Liberty Standard published an official exchange rate of
$1.00 equivalent to 1,309.03 BTC. Then, on February 6, 2010, the Bitcoin Market was
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Compared to normal debit or credit card systems that can take a few days to process transactions.
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established as the first official currency exchange for bitcoins. Thus, in the span of a little more
than a year, Bitcoin became an official currency with the capability of conversion between
preexisting currencies ("Abridged", 2013).
Many academics have speculated why exactly the currency came into existence, and one
of the more accepted conjectures relates to the global financial crisis that occurred in the year
prior. Some have suggested there is rising uncertainty in paper currencies such as the dollar
(Luther, 2015 and Richter et al., 2015). However, no government or central bank controls the
supply of bitcoins, so Bitcoin may be insulated from political instability. With that characteristic,
Bitcoin could prove more attractive to countries that experience higher instability. Still, its
volatility will likely arise as a point of contention on that matter.
As a currency, Bitcoin has proven to be quite volatile. Figure 1 illustrates the exchange
rate between one bitcoin and one United States dollar from February 19, 2013 to February 19,
2017.
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Clearly, there has been a wide range in the exchange rate in only four years. Though there
have been approximately 203 million transactions using bitcoins since 20092, the currency is still
relatively young and the network of acceptance is not particularly large (some sources suggest
more than 100,000 vendors as of February 2015 3). Since Bitcoin is still relatively new, there is
uncertainty in its performance and it is still quite sensitive to many shocks to the market. Thus,
the volatility of Bitcoin is higher than most established currencies. Presumably, this volatility
affects Bitcoin's capability of acting as a reliable store of value. In order to gain any degree of
acceptance, it is essential to provide some level of stability in terms of the value of the currency.
One important sense of value is the exchange rate. A lot of volatility in the exchange rate
exposes the Bitcoin holder to more risk. This risk is exactly like the concept of portfolio risk,
wherein holding different currencies is parallel to diversifying a portfolio. Different currency
exchange rates may perform differently over time, and if a small number of currencies are held,
the result will be similar to under-diversifying a portfolio. Additionally, the volatility of the
dollar likely influences the volatility of Bitcoin to some extent, given that the dollar's exchange
rate is influenced by supply and demand and Bitcoin's is as well. More uncertainty in the dollar
may cause people to be willing to accept another currency, which "diversifies" the currency
exchange risk. Ultimately, it would be interesting to see if a higher volatility of the dollar induces
greater use of Bitcoin.
Certainly, this is not the first instance of the introduction of a new international currency.
Prior to its introduction and shortly thereafter, the Euro was expected to displace the dollar to
some degree, and there was debate as to whether the Euro would replace the dollar as the
currency of choice for international transactions (Frisch, 2003). This paper will also highlight
2
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some of the arguments within that literature, compare the results to Bitcoin, and incorporate the
Euro's volatility as it is another widely accepted international currency.

3 Literature Review
Since its inception, a small but robust literature regarding the acceptance of Bitcoin has
been developed. Luther (2013) begins by attributing the emergence of electronic currencies to
increased efficiency in processing transactions and sustaining lower maintenance costs. He
acknowledges cryptocurrencies as emergent solutions to this uncertainty and highlights Bitcoin
as the primary example. He recognizes that there are several benefits to Bitcoin, such as the
anonymous nature of transactions, and describes the transactions as "effectively irreversible" and
similar to those conducted with cash. In contrast to credit and debit cards, Bitcoin bears no
possibility for a chargeback—once a transaction is completed, the buyer cannot request to
reverse it in the future. However, he argues that, due to network effects and switching costs,
widespread acceptance of a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin is not realistic.
To defend his assertion, Luther (2013) employs the previously mentioned model of
currency acceptance by Dowd and Greenaway (1993). The model operates under the assumption
that the value of attributed to a given currency depends somewhat on the amount of agents that
are willing to transact with it. Luther describes the "socially optimal" opportunity to switch as
when "the cost of switching is less than the net gain in utility from switching” (Luther, 2013).
The expected utility that an agent receives from switching currencies depends largely on
whether the agent expects that other agents will switch as well. If only one agent switches, then
the agent does not receive benefits within the network and only receives the net present value of
the new currency. Luther then lists statistics about the first three years of Bitcoin's performance,
which details the small network of Bitcoin users and the total transactions (the majority of which
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are less than one Bitcoin). These factors account for the model's ability to predict a lack of
widespread acceptance. Luther describes another scenario in which an agent's decision to switch
only depends on whether the currency was accepted historically rather than solely on whether
other agents will switch, but yields a similar conclusion: no one will choose to act first and thus
no one will switch. Ultimately, Luther concludes that, without any period of monetary instability
of support from the government, Bitcoin is unlikely to gain widespread acceptance. Still, he
concedes that the failure does not imply that existing cryptocurrencies are inferior, and a
successful transition requires great effort against network effects and switching costs.
Richter, Kraus, and Bouncken (2015) also begin by focusing on the causes for the
emergence of virtual currencies, namely, the loss of trust in the banking sector, the fear of losing
capital, lower interest rates recently, and the vast public uncertainty in the value in existing
currencies. They assert that virtual currencies offer a perspective on a new type of banking
system wherein many of those issues are alleviated. They describe in detail the five central
challenges posed by Guo and Chow (2008): the security threat of using the internet, the danger
of a virtual monetary system collapse, the impacts of real-world monetary systems on virtual
ones, money laundering, tax evasion, online criminals, and the value fluctuation of virtual
money. Richter, et al. then detail virtual currency systems that have already been accepted in
some form, which are closed virtual currency schemes (such as currency in online video games)
and virtual currency systems with differing directions of cash flow. They focus on the last of
these for their high relevance to the public and emphasize the similar notion that the smaller
network is a large downfall for virtual currency users. However, they concede that the field and
the currencies are still quite young. Ultimately, they conclude that virtual currencies will
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continue to progress and gain more acceptance, perhaps even more so with an "official, central
authority in the lead," such as a newly created, singular World Bank.
Given their increasing popularity, virtual currencies have also begun to attract speculation
regarding a proper form of regulation. Jeans (2014) focuses on the legal decisions and policies
existing for Bitcoin today and how they may affect how virtual currencies operate in the future.
With preexisting laws, he asserts that it is feasible to prevent cyber-crime, exercise taxation, and
provide consumer fraud protection for transactions made using Bitcoin. Jeans writes that Bitcoin
has been recognized by the IRS, and users may be subject to taxes related to capital gains.
Ultimately, classifying Bitcoin and other virtual currencies as property causes ambiguity as to
how they should be taxed. In addition, Jeans classifies Bitcoin as "hypervolatile" due to large
spikes and drops in value from speculation over regulation. He notes that the relatively smaller
volume of bitcoins in existence would cause relatively smaller events to have a larger impact on
the value, which could devalue real-world currencies as well. Finally, he writes that the
anonymity of transactions with Bitcoin still provides room for illegal activity, and thus regulation
and possible rejection of virtual currencies is still possible by the government. On this issue,
Jeans classifies Germany as a strong proponent, China and Russia as fierce opponents, and
Canada, India, and the European Union as wavering back and forth over their final stance.
Though it is a virtual currency, Bitcoin can also provide beneficial services that may not
be immediately apparent. Luther and Olson (2014) begin by equating money to memory (as was
originally done by Kocherlakota (1998a; 1998b; 2002b)), and imply that it is a publicly updated
record of all transactions based on public record-keeping abilities. They analyze Bitcoin's ability
to act as a medium of exchange, describing its strengths in having "quasi-anonymous"
transactions. The supply of Bitcoin is also predictable and not subject to shocks in the monetary
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supply, but maintains disadvantages by having a predetermined supply and purchasing power
fluctuations in response to changes in demand. Luther and Olson argue that transactions costs are
still significant since it takes ten minutes to process a transaction block, while also highlighting
the small user base and the lack of vendors that accept Bitcoin as a form of payment. Still, they
concede that regardless of network effects, Bitcoin has garnered some acceptance. They mention
that from May 2012 to May 2014, market capitalization increased from $100 million to $6.2
billion and they find that Bitcoin Gold app downloads were larger in countries with troubled
banking systems.
Not all countries are inclined to immediately accept virtual currencies, and many
governments have even demonstrated significant reluctance toward them. Hendrickson, Hogan,
and Luther (2015) detail certain governments, such as China, that have banned the use of virtual
currencies due to the rapid growth of its network. They analyze whether a government can
actually prevent Bitcoin transactions or inadvertently push use directly into illegal markets. They
highlight Bitcoin's presence in over fifty gambling websites that transact with the currency and
the sale of drugs on the Silk Road in exchange for Bitcoin as well. They define a "Bitcoin
Equilibrium" in which "Bitcoin, but not currency, is accepted in exchange," and a "coexistence
equilibrium" that provides a basis for both Bitcoin and currency to be accepted for exchange.
They conclude that even if every private agent is willing to accept Bitcoin, as long as the
government does not accept it, it can still remove Bitcoin from circulation and restore a
preexisting currency without repercussion. Outside of Bitcoin being held exclusively by the
government, many transactions are still out of reach for government policy. Hendrickson, et al.
find that there is a requirement for the government to be a certain size, depending on the amount
of agents that are willing to accept the traditional currency, in order to prevent Bitcoin's
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circulation. They attribute the lack of uniform Bitcoin acceptance among different communities
and governments to that finding, and they expect that preference for Bitcoin is higher in
countries with greater levels of technology and internet access. They also suggest this preference
holds in countries where inflationary central bank policies render the traditional currency a lesser
substitute.
Moore and Christin (2013) argue that Bitcoin's main advantages lie in its decentralized
nature, requirement of proving procedures to keep the supply of Bitcoins limited, and status as an
alternative to those who fear hyperinflation of the dollar due to excessive deflation by the
Federal Reserve. Given the privacy in Bitcoin transactions, one may speculate that theft and
piracy may arise as relevant issues. They focus on instances of Bitcoin theft, such as in March
2012 when over 43,000 Bitcoins were stolen from the Bitcoinica trading platform, and in
September 2012 when over $250,000 worth was stolen from the Bitfloor currency exchange.
Moore and Christin (2013) also highlight that the Bitcoin exchange rate has still fluctuated
regardless of the known hacks and theft aside from two instances in 2011 and 2012. They
discuss the existence of third parties that intermediate exchanges between physical and virtual
currency, online wallets, investment services, and other related services. Using data from
bitcoincharts.com, they construct a model that employs average daily transaction volume,
whether a security breach occurred, and the AML/CFT compliance by financial regulators.
Ultimately, they show that popular exchanges have a higher likelihood for a security breach, and
they find that exchanges that process more transactions are not as prone to closure. Additionally,
they analyze the months in which the exchanges were operational, count the number of possible
days the exchange could have been hacked, and conclude that transaction volume is positively
correlated with the chances of a breach occurring. They also highlight the proof-of-work
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mechanics for Bitcoin transaction verification and the associated economic costs of performing
such services. Finally, they consider the possibility of Bitcoin users that have an increasing
preference for transaction anonymity, which could cause them to use an exchange service with a
higher risk.
Until this point, the primary consideration for countries that might adopt Bitcoin have
been primarily those that are fully developed. Clegg (2014) focuses on the possibility of
countries that are still developing and how Bitcoin's characteristics could transform their
economies given its infrastructure. He discusses how the currency's decentralized nature protects
against rapid inflation and volatility, providing the example of Zimbabwe's extreme
hyperinflation in 2008 which caused a switch to the dollar, a currency with much greater
stability. He describes Bitcoin as "isolated from political volatility" which also protects from
corruption within a government, which is more common among developing countries. He
emphasizes Bitcoin's limited and predetermined supply as a major advantage over countries that
are able to simply print more money and redistribute wealth while simultaneously causing
inflation. Clegg proceeds by mentioning Bitcoin's distributed consensus model, i.e., the
requirement of 51 percent of the Bitcoin miners to agree on any major changes to the system. He
argues that it would be detrimental to each miner to attempt to devalue the currency in an attempt
to gain greater control over it, and thus the currency is far less susceptible to that kind of attack.
Then, he cites Kenya as a country that has widespread use of M-Pesa, a mobile money
management service, and demonstrates that households with access to M-Pesa could better
recover from negative shocks such as job loss or yearly harvest issues. He also emphasizes that
M-Pesa is at a disadvantage to Bitcoin since it requires a user to travel to a retail store to process
transactions frequently; Bitcoin, however, can simply be managed online, and offers more
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privacy. Clegg then discusses another advantage in that current Bitcoin users have a direct
interest to attract new users because it encourages more vendors to accept it and increases the
network size. He mentions how the comparatively low transaction fees and the inclusion of
lesser developed regions to increase the network size also favor Bitcoin over other mobile
services. Finally, he concedes that having access to the Internet is one of the largest barriers to
these countries, as clearly it is quite difficult to transact with Bitcoin without having reasonably
widespread Internet access.
It is also worth considering a previous major shift in currency to evaluate the transition
and the performance shortly thereafter. Mundell (1998) describes the history of the Euro, its
introduction on January 1, 1999, and the transition to a single currency and entity from the
European Monetary Union. He argues that this transition will be even more powerful than the
1944 Bretton Woods transition and the removal of gold from backing the dollar in 1971 since the
United States and its currency remained in power both times. He highlights the criteria for any
country to convert to the Euro, and specifically mentions how the debt to GDP ratio needs to be
less than 60 percent. Mundell then asserts that any given currency's stability is influenced by
both the range that its market dominates and its store of value, and questions whether the Euro
will be able to attain the same characteristics as other major world currencies such as the United
States dollar. He argues that, regardless of the most accepted currency, there is always a secondmost accepted currency that will replace the existing one, should political ramifications render
the former obsolete. He highlights size and stability of the second currency as the primary
contributing factors, and asserts that a steadily growing international debt will render the world
unable to rely solely on the dollar. However, he concedes that the transition period poses a great
threat to the stability of the new currency, so the new currency must remain stable in order to
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replace the old one. Mundell continues by emphasizing the importance of the Japanese Yen
alongside the dollar and the euro, stating that Asia's economic performance rivals that of the rest
of the world and that the exchange rates among the three should be monitored closely. In regard
to the transition specifically, he argues that countries wishing to diversify reserves with the new
currency may experiences issues until the European Central Bank establishes a reputation. He
concludes that the introduction of the Euro will give the world an alternative to the dollar that
provides stability and more power in constructing a future international monetary system.
In considering the Euro's performance thus far, it may seem surprising that it has not
displaced the dollar to a larger extent. Frisch (2003) discusses this topic, and begins by detailing
the history of the Euro and its introduction to society, defining its criteria for price stability, and
contrasting the components of the European Central Bank's monetary strategy with that of the
Federal Reserve. He proceeds through the three fundamental characteristics of money,
highlighting that the dollar remained a dominant international currency (and therefore medium of
exchange) through the period of 1998 to 2001. Next, he states that the Euro rose to parity with
the dollar in regard to being a unit of account given its command over a market for issuing
international bonds. Then, he describes how the share of the dollar in global portfolios dropped
significantly leading up to the introduction of the Euro, while other European currencies’ shares
increased. Given the success in introducing the Euro, he questions why the Euro’s share of the
world economy did not displace the dollar even more. He answers that question by discussing
how users are more inclined to remain with a currency that all other users favor, and the effect of
the economies of scale for lower transaction costs with larger volumes. He includes that the
network externalities provided by an international currency do not require extra cost to grant
extra utility in being able to transact internationally. He then highlights that the Euro actually
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depreciated against the dollar for the first two years of its existence, but he notes that it is still
early to fully ascertain how well it can displace the dollar. Frisch ultimately concludes that the
future for the Euro looks quite favorable, and that the Euro can be on par with the dollar in
regard to acceptance and performance. He concedes, however, that the process could be lengthy
when considering how long it took the dollar to displace the British pound. Still, he notes that the
United States current account deficit (in 2003) is unsustainable, and that the dollar would have to
depreciate in order to continue to service net foreign debt in the future, ultimately benefiting the
Euro.

4 Data
This paper uses seven time series variables: the number of vendors accepting Bitcoin,
three variables of the weekly closing price of the exchange rate for Bitcoin, the United States
dollar, and the Euro (all relative to the Japanese Yen), and three weekly percent changes for
those exchange rates. Though Bitcoin launched in 2009, there does not seem to be data regarding
the actual number of vendors. Thus, the number of vendors was gathered from the number of
vendors on coinmap.org, a website where vendors can register to be added to a map depicting
where Bitcoin is accepted for transactions. The weekly closing prices were obtained from
coindesk.com, and the weekly percent change was calculated manually in R. There are 211
observation weeks from February 19, 2013 to February 28, 2017. Initially, the exchange rates
were relative to the dollar, but that caused confusion in comparing each one without being able
to discern the dollar's volatility. Therefore, each of the exchange rate variables is relative to the
Japanese Yen so that they are all on a relative basis and can be compared to one another. The
Yen was also chosen because historically it has been a relatively stable currency, and any
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volatility it experiences will be reflected in each of the three. Table 1 includes the descriptive
statistics for each of the variables described.
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables: Weekly from February 19, 2013 - February 28, 2017

Table 1

5 Methodology
The analysis tests whether increases in the volatility of the dollar or Euro causes the
volatility of Bitcoin to increase, and also whether increased volatility of the dollar or Euro causes
the number of vendors that accept Bitcoin to increase. A vector autoregression (VAR) is
estimated using the following equations:
(1)
(2)
In Equation (1),
that accept Bitcoin at time ,

is the volatility of Bitcoin at time ,

is the number of vendors

is the volatility of the United States dollar at time , and

the volatility of the Euro at time . All variables with a subscript of

is

denote the lag of the

respective variable by one time period. To determine the number of lags, selection-order criteria
are implemented on the Bitcoin volatility and the number of vendors, including the volatility of
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the dollar and of the Euro as exogenous variables. The number of vendors is also a nonstationary variable, so for this VAR the number of vendors is converted into first differences.
From the VAR, we generate impulse response functions (IRFs) of the number of bitcoins
in response to a shock to the number of vendors. It is well known that the ordering of the
variables affects the identification scheme, and therefore we will check both orderings. The
results from those functions may produce significant long-term responses. If so, there is evidence
of uncertainty about the future purchasing power of national currencies which also encourages
the use of Bitcoin. Ultimately, these questions aid in determining the degree of viability of
Bitcoin as a medium for international exchange.
After generating the IRFs, we also conduct an analysis using Jordá's (2005) linear
projection method. In order to do so, nine Newey-West regressions of the form
(3)
are estimated for all 0

8. These regressions incorporate subsequent periods of the number

of vendors to generate another IRF based on

. These errors aid in reducing the amount of

possible autocorrelation in the regressors and are less susceptible to possible heteroskedasticity.
The advantage to running these regressions is that they do not require the same assumptions on
the structure (i.e., the stationarity of the number of vendors), that the VAR requires.

6 Results
First, selection-order criteria are implemented to determine the proper number of lags to
use. The results from that analysis are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2
The selection-order criteria unanimously suggests a lag of three periods for the VAR. From the
VAR, we generate IRFs which show the effect on each of the variables from a shock to any of
the other variables. Here, we show the relevant impulse responses.

Figure 2
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Figure 2 shows that an upward shock in growth rate of the number of vendors causes the Bitcoin
volatility to increase in the first three periods and then decrease thereafter. This result implies
that an increased number of vendors may ultimately contribute to a decreased level of Bitcoin
volatility.

Figure 3
Figure 3 depicts the reverse ordering and implies that an upward shock in the volatility of Bitcoin
causes an increase in the growth rate of number of vendors, which slowly decreases over time.
This result implies that more vendors may accept Bitcoin as its volatility increases, which
contradicts a typical expectation.
Next, we view the forecast error variance decomposition results from this VAR in Table
3. These results indicate that the ordering with Bitcoin volatility first and number of vendors
second yields significantly greater effects than the opposite ordering. Therefore, we conclude
that there are causal effects due to the order of the two variables.
17

Table 3
Next, the results from the nine regressions using Jordá's method are listed in Table 4.

Table 4
18

In the first regression, Bitcoin volatility has a statistically significant effect on the number of
vendors as demonstrated by the first row of results. The coefficient is -31.556, which implies that
as Bitcoin volatility increases, the number vendors decreases by approximately 31.556. This
result seems much more reasonable given that a more volatile currency is less likely to be
accepted. We demonstrate the results of the other eight regressions with the corresponding IRF
for the

coefficients in Figure 4.
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Figure 4
From this IRF, it appears that the coefficient values start off quite negative and then slowly
increase over time. This result implies that an upward shock to the volatility of Bitcoin causes a
sharp decrease in the number of vendors that slowly begins to increase after the sixth period.

7 Conclusion
The primary goal of this paper is to attempt to show whether Bitcoin's ability to act as a
store of value and its level of price volatility affect the number of people that will accept it as a
currency. The first VAR results are somewhat contradictory, implying that an increase in the
19

number of vendors causes the volatility of Bitcoin to both decrease and increase. The NeweyWest regression results seem more reasonable given that they imply that a spike in the volatility
of Bitcoin causes the number of vendors to decrease. Overall, the results from both methods
imply that there is a significant effect from the volatility of the Bitcoin on the number of vendors.
Thus, this evidence suggests that Bitcoin's level of price volatility directly affects the number of
people that are willing to accept it as a currency.
An improvement upon these analyses would be to include more recent data as the data set
was relatively small. Given that Bitcoin is still somewhat new, it continues to experience quite a
lot of volatility, exemplified by its recent upward exchange rate spikes in May of 2017.
Additionally, the number of vendors variable could be significantly improved upon given that it
requires vendor to register on a specific website. As mentioned earlier, the true number of
vendors may actually be more than 100,000 as of February 2015, and thus an improved number
of vendors variable may lead to other or more significant conclusions.
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